I think the evidence from the novel shows that, in theory, Lucy might well\nhave been able to bring cases for breach of promise against Edward, had he\ndeserted her.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
My researches show also, IMHO that Willoughby knew the law relating to\nBreach of Promise rather well, (and note, he would have had easy access to the\ncurrent state of the law as the reports of these cases were not published in\nobscure law reports but in widely read magazines like The Gentleman\u2019s Magazine\nand the Town and Country Magazine. He was despicable, IMO, in that he acted\nwith regard to Marianne so that he kept just the right side of the law to\nafford him protection. It makes his actions regarding her all the more\ncalculating, IMVHO.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Before I get carried away, let me explain a little about the nature of the\naction for breach of promise.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Marriage in the 18th \/early 19th century was a rather serious proposition,\nin that unlike today it was virtually impossible to divorce. Plus, it was, of\ncourse, the only true calling for a woman of any respectability. Making an\noffer of such a marriage therefore was a very serious thing. A woman was\nentitled to rely upon such an offer, as it would seriously affect her future.\nWe know from our reading of The Gentleman\u2019s Daughter by Amanda Vickery that\neven broken engagements by mutual consent, reflected badly on the female who\nhad called off the match. Amanda Vickery also points out that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cUnquestionably men enjoyed great rhetorical license in the art and\nmystery of courtship. It was inappropriate for a woman to confess her\nsentiments until convinced of her suitor\u2019s intentions. Moralists deplored the\npretender who tried to secure prior assurances of love before he made his\noffer- a cynical policy, aimed, it was said, at circumventing the woman\u2019s right\nto refuse.\u201d<\/em> After the introduction of The Marriage Act of 1753 it was the Common Law\nCourts and not the Ecclesiastical courts who dealt, in the main with breach of\npromise suits, which though they existed prior to the 18th century, did not\ntake off as a legal concept until after the case of Jesson v Collins in 1703,\nin which it was held that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n On a promise of marriage, damages may be recovered on an action at law if\neither party refuses to marry After the case of Hutton v Mansell (Eng. Rep. 87:928) in 1787 common law\njudges had a discretion to take into account, when deciding a case, not only\nthe tacit consent of a woman\u2019s lover, but also what we would now term as little\nmore than circumstantial evidence-conversations, the gifts of a lover, his\nactions, her dependence upon those actions, witnesses who overheard\nconversations, or viewed the couple as engaged to be married etc., etc. They\ndid not just need written evidence of an offer of marriage. Merely saying \u201cwill\nyou marry me?\u201d was sufficient (if the evidence was believed, of course). The plaintiffs fell into three broad types.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There was the woman who had allowed sexual intercourse to take place after\nexchanging promises of marriage which were repudiated after she became\npregnant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Second, there was the woman who exchanged promises of marriage in the future\nwith a young man struggling to make his way in the world, and who remained\nchaste and faithful to him for several years, sometimes as many as six, and\nthen learned that her lover had married someone else, sometimes by his own\nchoice and sometimes under pressure from his parents and friends. The woman had\nrejected other suitors for many years and now found herself at a disadvantage\non the marriage market at a fairly late age, a disadvantage for which she\nsought monetary compensation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Third, there was the woman, often a widow of mature age, who had entered\ninto careful negotiations with a man, agreed to marry him, set the day, bought\nher clothes and wound up her business affairs only to find that the man backed\nout of the agreement at the very last moment, just before or on the wedding\nday. She sued for compensation for her hurt feelings and her blighted hopes for\na husband There were also a small number of male defendants who were the innocent\nvictim of entrapment by scheming females whose sole object in pursuing a\nrelationship was not marriage but suing for damages, when the break took place. The poor could not afford to go to law, and there is probably none form the\nhighest strata, not because of any higher moral leanings of that class, but\nbecause they could afford to buy off any potential plaintiffs, and also bind\nthem to silence in the same manner.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The middle classes were the ones who sought to use this legal remedy; and of\ncourse it did have its drawbacks, namely publicity. The cases were reported in\npublications of the period which were distributed widely over the country, such\nas the gentleman magazine and Town and Country magazine. This as I am sure one\nof the main reasons for any prospective plaintiff begin reluctant to pursue a\ncase.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So, having seen that the common law took a fairly broad approach to\ninterpreting the evidence on these types of cases, what damages could the\ndefaulting suitor expect to pay? During our period, the courts took into\naccount, when assessing damages, the relative moral conduct of the two parties\nand their relative circumstances in life. The reported cases show that as a\nresult the damages tended to be quite modest and the vast majority of the\nawards for breach of promise suits were between \u00a3100-500. (See Bind v Oliver\n(1798) and Foster v Mellish (1802).<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, exceptionally high damages were awarded against defendants who were\nrich and had behaved very badly towards their so-called fianc\u00e9s.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One such defendant , as reported in the Gentleman\u2019s Magazine of 1747 (p293)\nwas a clergyman who had made promises of marriage to a lady which were never\nfulfilled as a result of which the lady had refused the addresses of another\ngentleman. (So, thereby, she was disadvantaged on the marriage market: would\nshe ever get another offer?) She was awarded damages by the court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A pertinent case in relation to S+S is that of Austen (no relation) v.\nVereker (1815). Here the defendant was a major, the son and heir of a colonel\nwho was also a nobleman. The plaintiff was merely the daughter of a respectable\nbut relatively minor country gentleman.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The major had courted the girl, and despite being warned off by her father,\nthe pair had carried out a clandestine correspondence, during the course of\nwhich he wrote in one letter that<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cI was ready to run all risks and marry you\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the end the pressure put on him by his noble relatives and by her father\nwas too much to bear, and he courted and married a rich woman of his own social\nclass: as a result of this marriage the luxurious life promised him by his\nfather as an inducement to marry was secured. By doing his father\u2019s will and\nmarrying his chosen bride, he would be assured of inheriting a fortune which\nwould bring him \u00a320,000 per annum.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The plaintiff, Miss Austen, however, was left with nothing. Her father had\ndied in the interim leaving her little money. She had no husband, despite\nthinking she was going to get one, nor did she have any substantial dowry with\nwhich she might attract one. As a result, she brought the action against the\ndefendant (for, IMHO, she had very little left to lose). Not his fault but her wrong that you are to estimate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The letter he had written to her was adjudged by the court to be sufficient\nevidence of his intention to marry her and it corroborated her claim that they\nhad been engaged to marry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The jury assessed the wronged to be compensated by the quite breathtaking\nsum of \u00a34000. So, let\u2019s draw this long post to a close. However, it is my assessment of the situation, that the reason they seemed\noblivious to the prospect of being sued was they had the arrogant assurance of\na rich family that the engagement could be broken off, and should Lucy create a\nfuss and threaten to bring an action, she would simply have been brought off by\nthem via their lawyers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n They had sufficient resources to do this, and to also ensure her silence at\nthe same time, probably by paying her off under the terms of an annuity, which\nwould cease on her marriage (if any) or, more importantly, if she spread\nrumours about her one time engagement with Edward.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Edward of course tried to let her down gently, giving her the option to\nwithdraw: but she would not be dissuaded…until rich Robert Ferrars appeared,\nof course.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Now for Willougby. We do know, that although he and Marianne had acted as an\nengaged couple- visiting Mrs. Smith\u2019s home, corresponding, exchanging love\ntokens etc. etc. that Willoughy had very carefully never mentioned an\nengagement to her either in words or in writing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And as he says in his confession to Elinor in chapter 44, that just before\nhe was to propose marriage to Marianne, his affair with Eliza became known to\nMrs. Smith and he as summarily ordered to marry the girl. He refused, realised\nhis future lay before him as a poverty struck man, and resolved then to marry\nMiss Grey with all her lovely money, and with whom he had previously had some\nform of relationship:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “She taxed me with the offence, at once, and my confusion may be\nguessed. The purity of her life, the formality of her notions, her ignorance of\nthe world — everything was against me. The matter itself I could not deny, and\nvain was every endeavour to soften it. She was previously disposed, I believe,\nto doubt the morality of my conduct in general, and was moreover discontented\nwith the very little attention, the very little portion of my time that I had\nbestowed on her, in my present visit. In short, it ended in a total breach. By\none measure I might have saved myself. In the height of her morality, good\nwoman! She offered to forgive the past if I would marry Eliza. That could not\nbe — and I was formally dismissed from her favour and her house. The night\nfollowing this affair — I was to go the next morning — was spent by me in\ndeliberating on what my future conduct should be. The struggle was great — but\nit ended too soon. My affection for Marianne, my thorough conviction of her\nattachment to me — it was all insufficient to outweigh that dread of poverty,\nor get the better of those false ideas of the necessity of riches, which I was\nnaturally inclined to feel, and expensive society had increased. I had reason\nto believe myself secure of my present wife, if I chose to address her, and I\npersuaded myself to think that nothing else in common prudence remained for me\nto do. An heavy scene however awaited me, before I could leave Devonshire; I\nwas engaged to dine with you on that very day, some apology was therefore\nnecessary for my breaking the engagement. But whether I should write this\napology, or deliver it in person, was a point of long debate. To see Marianne,\nI felt would be dreadful, and I even doubted whether I could see her again, and\nkeep to my resolution. In that point, however, I undervalued my own\nmagnanimity, as the event declared; for I went, I saw her, and saw her\nmiserable, and left her miserable — and left her, hoping never to see her\nagain.”<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n It seems to me that, in the light of the cases I have quote above,\nWilloughby skated very close to the wind and the law, but carefully, nay\ncalculatingly, always kept on the right side of it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I can, I think, accuse him of being very clever, for, by not declaring his\nintention to Marianne in words, though his conduct and hers persuaded others\nthat they were engaged, he might have avoided an action for breach of promise,\nhis defense being that though he had been imprudent in his actions (as had\nMarianne) no promise, mention or even a whiff of the word marriage had been\nmade by him at any time to her.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So yes, in conclusion there was honour at stake in both cases, but there was\nalso in the Ferrars family situation vis-a-vis Lucy a lot of money to be lost\nif Lucy had brought a legal case against them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Once again I take my figurative hat off to JA and her command of the\nworkings of the law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And Willoughby goes to the top of my list of JA Baddies, for being just\ncautious enough in his behaviour with Marianne: a caution that stemmed, IMVHO,\nfrom a well developed self preservation instinct and a knowledge of the law relating\nto Breach of Promise Suits.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Barbara follows the above post:<\/p>\n\n\n\n I wanted to quote this other little bit of a speech by Willoughby in the\nsame chapter that shows, as you say, that he was well aware of what he was\ndoing and had been very calculating about the whole thing–well aware of\nexactly what was, and more importantly was NOT being said:<\/p>\n\n\n\n I felt my intentions were strictly honourable, and my feelings blameless.\nEven then, however, when fully determined on paying my addresses to her, I\nallowed myself most improperly to put off, from day to day, the moment of doing\nit, from an unwillingness to enter into an engagement while my circumstances\nwere so greatly embarrassed. I will not reason here — nor will I stop for you\nto expatiate on the absurdity, and the worse than absurdity, of scrupling to\nengage my faith where my honour was already bound. The event has proved, that I\nwas a cunning fool, providing with great circumspection for a possible\nopportunity of making myself contemptible and wretched forever.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" I think the evidence from the novel shows that, in theory, Lucy might well have been able to bring cases for breach of promise against Edward, had he deserted her. My researches show also, IMHO that Willoughby knew the law … Continue reading
\np56.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nBut, by the mid-18th century, the Ecclesiastical Courts had tended not to\nenforce any promise to marry unless it was evidenced in writing, whereas the\ncommon law courts were sometimes willing to accept an oral contract evidenced\nnot by words but merely by actions which they could interpret as evidence that\nan engagement existed. This led to aggrieved plaintiffs (people who brought\nactions to remedy a wrong) bringing their cases in the common law courts, as\nthey correctly judged that they had more chance of success there.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nLawrence Stone in his book The Road to Divorce has studied 60 of these late\n18th century\/early 19th century cases for breach of promise. Interestingly,\nfrom that study he concludes that there were three distinct types of plaintiffs\nin these cases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\np88.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nStone\u2019s assessment of these cases in our period is very interesting because\nthey do not include any plaintiffs \/ defendants from the lowest or very highest\nlevels of society, but mainly concern the type of people Jane Austen wrote\nabout- the middle classes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nHer lawyer argued that she had: \u201cseen her happiness sacrificed to the pride of\npower and the pomp of heraldry.\u201d
\nThe judge told the jury to ignore what was the cause of the defendant\u2019s breach\nof promise, which was, in effect the threats from his relatives, as it was<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nMuch public comment was made on this case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nIMVHO, Lucy Steele had, had Edward not acted morally and honourably towards her\nonce his secret engagement had become known to his family, a good case against\nhim. The Ferrars family might very well as Barbara said in her post, above:
\nSeemed to think that all Edward needed to do to break off a bona fide\nengagement with Lucy was just say he wanted out because the engagement had never\nbeen made public.<\/p>\n\n\n\n